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“Fleeing Gangs, Children Head to U.S. Border”
New York Times July 9, 2014
In summer of 2014, headlines throughout the hemisphere called attention to an unfolding tragedy: the
plight of Central Americans fleeing north to escape
the violence engulfing their communities. The staggering number of migrants seeking refuge sparked a great
deal of debate within the United States, particularly
due to the large numbers of children. In 2014, approximately 57,000 unaccompanied minors traveled from
Central America to Mexico, continuing north to cross
the U.S. border illegally. Once in the United States,
most children turned themselves over to U.S. Border
Control agents and faced swift deportation proceedings. Others have been temporarily reunited with
family members throughout the United States, waiting
for the courts to decide their fate. Thus far in 2015, the
number of unaccompanied child apprehensions on the
southwest border has declined compared to 2014.

The large numbers of people fleeing Guatemala,
El Salvador, and Honduras testify not only to the violence of illicit markets but also to the failure of these
countries’ governments to fulfill their most important task—protecting the lives of their citizens.
However, some border crossing zones (particularly the Big Bend and Yuma sectors) report sharp
increases in apprehension rates, indicating that
migrants and traffickers may be adjusting their
tactics to try to elude U.S. border agents.1 In Mexico,
apprehension and deportation rates of Central
American migrants have almost doubled this year,
as Mexican officials have ramped up enforcement

efforts at the behest of U.S. officials. Central
Americans are still fleeing, but many are detained in
Mexico before they reach the U.S. border.
The large numbers of children fleeing Central
America has led politicians, pundits, and average people to question U.S. immigration policy, deportation
proceedings, and criteria for refugee status. The United
States plays a critical role in this crisis. U.S. demand for
drugs drives much of the violence in Central America
today, and traffickers are able to capitalize on easy
access to guns and ammunition in the United States to
improve the armed might of gangs and drug cartels.
Despite the electoral commitments of both Democrats
and Republicans, serious efforts to reform U.S. immigration policy have languished.
The migration emergency, however, is not just a product
of U.S. policies on drugs, guns, and immigration. Some
Central American governments have exacerbated the
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FIGURE 1: HOMICIDE RATES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO (UNODC 2014)
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Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2014

security crisis that created the exodus
in the first place. Throughout Central
America, organized crime and corresponding violence thrive in areas with
weak and unresponsive governments.
The large numbers of people fleeing
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras
testify not only to the violence of illicit
markets but also to the failure of these
countries’ governments to fulfill their
most important task—protecting the
lives of their citizens.
In contrast, some Central American
countries have been able to contain
the crime crisis and provide a minimum level of safety for their people.
Nicaragua and Panama face some of
the same challenges as Guatemala,
El Salvador, and Honduras, yet their
response to the security crisis is markedly different. Nicaragua and Panama

have invested in the creation of civilian police forces that aim to respond
to the needs of citizens, and they have
developed public security policies that
favor prevention and rehabilitation
over repression. Rather than relying on militarized tactics to subdue
suspected criminals, Nicaragua and
Panama have sought to invest in community policing models and address
the socio-economic conditions that
allow crime to thrive in the first place.
The experiences of these two countries offer important insights. They
demonstrate that new democracies
can overcome the challenges posed
by poverty, inequality, and authoritarian rule, and invest in institutions
that uphold the rights and safety of
their citizens. To understand how

The experiences of [Nicaragua
and Panama] offer important
insights. They demonstrate that
new democracies can overcome
the challenges posed by poverty,
inequality, and authoritarian
rule, and invest in institutions
that uphold the rights and safety
of their citizens.
Central American governments can
respond to crime in ways that will not
prompt their citizens to flee, we can
learn from the evolution of policing
practices in Nicaragua and Panama,
and how police have interacted with
the communities they serve.
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The Security Crisis
in Central America
In 2013, more than a third of all
global homicides occurred in the
Americas, home to only 14 percent
of the world’s population.2 Central
America tied with sub-Saharan
Africa as the most violent region in
the world. In the Northern Triangle
countries (Guatemala, El Salvador,
and Honduras), average homicide
rates in 2013 were more than 12
times higher than the U.S. rate of
4.7 per 100,000. At 90.4 per 100,000,
homicide rates in Honduras are the
highest in the world.
Citizens in the region have
observed these rising rates of violent crime with alarm. In a 2014
poll, respondents in five out of six
Central American countries identified crime as the gravest problem
in their country.3 Figure 2 reports
the percentage of respondents in
each country who indicated crime
was the most pressing national
problem. In every country except
Nicaragua, crime eclipsed concerns
over economic issues like unemployment, poverty, and inequality.
Furthermore, recent research links
Central Americans’ experiences and
perceptions of crime to an increased
likelihood of migration.4 Given these
circumstances, it isn’t surprising that
the countries with the most serious
crime—Guatemala, Honduras, and
El Salvador—are generating such
high numbers of emigrants, particularly to the United States.
Costa Rica and Panama have very
low levels of emigration in general.
Rates of violent crime in Costa
Rica are almost double those of the
United States, but still far lower than
the regional average. Crime is of
concern, but it has not motivated
a large wave of emigration, in part

3

FIGURE 2: PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME IN CENTRAL AMERICA (2014)

Source: 2014 AmericasBarometer, Latin American Public Opinion Project

because of the economic benefits
provided to citizens through Costa
Rica’s social welfare system. Similar
to Costa Rica, rates of violent crime
in Panama are quite high compared
to the United States but still lower
than the regional average. The
violent crime rate is triple that of the
United States, and above the threshold that international organizations
consider detrimental to a country’s
stability.5 Still, as this brief will show
later, citizens have greater confidence
that their police can provide public
safety, reducing the hopelessness that
often motivates emigration. Panama’s
recent economic boom creates further incentives for citizens to stay.
Nicaragua has a higher level of emigration, but migrants predominantly
head south to Costa Rica instead of
north to the United States. Following
a 1998 guest worker agreement
between Nicaragua and Costa Rica,
large numbers of Nicaraguans have
migrated for seasonal and long-term

employment opportunities. In
Nicaragua, public fear of crime is very
low. At 11.3 per 100,000, homicide
rates are low for the region (though
still high by international standards),
and for the past two decades, citizens
have expressed far more confidence
that their justice institutions can handle increases in violent crime compared to citizens in the other Central
American countries.6 Nicaraguan
migration is not tied to security concerns, but to economic ones.

Origins of the Crisis
How did the security crisis, and its
subsequent refugee crisis, begin?
Much of the answer lies in the political and economic changes that swept
the region in the 1990s. During this
time, Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Nicaragua signed peace treaties to
end decades of civil war and adopted
democratic forms of governance.
These nascent democracies had to
create new domestic police forces
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while simultaneously disarming
combatants and rebuilding infrastructure. Honduras also faced formidable challenges during the 1990s,
as its geographic proximity to the
civil wars of its neighbors rendered
it a destination for tens of thousands
of refugees, as well as insurgents
launching incursions across the
borders.7 As in the post-conflict
countries, democracy replaced
authoritarian rule in Honduras in
the 1990s, and the new democratic
government faced the daunting challenge of disarming former combatants, creating new civil institutions,
and addressing the needs of citizens.
U.S. policy exacerbated postwar problems in El Salvador and
Honduras, as the United States
deported record numbers of
Salvadoran gang members (particularly from Los Angeles) back
to postwar El Salvador, and most
deportees could not find work in the
legal economy.8 During this time of
transition, the gangs solidified their
criminal networks, cultivated ties
with corrupt officials, and extended
their presence to neighboring countries like Honduras.
Nicaragua had to disarm combatants and rebuild after decades of war,
but it did not experience the same
influx of gang activity during its
transition to democracy. Nicaragua’s
success at blocking gangs is partially
due to its wartime experiences in the
1980s, as the Sandinistas prioritized
border security to thwart Contra
attacks launched from Honduras.
This emphasis on border security
made it difficult for transnational
gangs to enter Nicaragua even after
the war. The Sandinistas also created neighborhood-level defense
organizations, which evolved into
community associations that helped
police neighborhoods and keep more

dangerous foreign gangs out.9 Most
importantly, the police of Nicaragua
evolved quite differently from the
other post-conflict countries of
Central America, making a complete break from their authoritarian
and repressive past following the
overthrow of the Somoza dynasty
in 1979. Nicaragua’s new constitution created an apolitical, professional, and civilian police force, and
stipulated that police must respect
citizen rights and the rule of law.
This foundation has led Nicaraguan
police to emphasize prevention and
intervention over repression when
fighting crime. Nicaragua’s emphasis
on crime prevention makes it harder
for gangs to recruit disaffected youth
and use prisons as training grounds
for new members. Some youth join
smaller-scale neighborhood pandillas, but large, sophisticated gangs
have not established a stronghold
in the country.10 Nicaragua is not
completely immune to the influence
of organized crime, however, as officials from the Nicaraguan National
Police have faced charges of complicity in money laundering and drug
trafficking operations.11 Still, cartels
and gangs do not have the same grip
on the country’s government and
economy as they do in Guatemala, El
Salvador, and Honduras.
Panama has followed a very different political trajectory, but faced
similar problems under democratic
rule. Given its geographic location,
Panama has long served as a hub
facilitating the transfer of legal and
illegal goods and services, and its
role in illicit drug trade intensified
in the 1980s under General Manuel
Noriega. The U.S. Department of
Justice interrupted Noriega’s lucrative
yet illicit career when it issued a warrant for his arrest on drug trafficking
charges. In 1989, the United States

invaded Panama to enforce this
warrant, subsequently destroying
the Panamanian army and capturing
Noriega. In the aftermath of the invasion, Panama overhauled its security
forces and created a civilian national
police force. Democratic reforms
transformed Panamanian institutions throughout the 1990s, but the
illicit sector proved resilient, particularly as Panama’s strong international
banking center and adoption of the
U.S. dollar made it an appealing site
for money laundering.12

Despite their different political
histories, the Central American
countries all experienced economic transformations in the
1980s and 1990s. These economic
transitions led market forces, even
illegal market forces like drug
trafficking, to become far more
powerful than many states.
With its long history of democratic
rule, Costa Rica did not experience
the tumultuous political transitions
of its neighbors in the 1990s. Indeed,
Costa Rica’s stability has made it
a destination for many migrants,
particularly from Nicaragua. As
noted above, following a 1998 agreement between Nicaragua and Costa
Rica, large numbers of Nicaraguans
have migrated south for economic
reasons, and according to rough
estimates 8 percent of the population
in Costa Rica is from Nicaragua.13
Despite their different political
histories, the Central American
countries all experienced economic
transformations in the 1980s and
1990s. These economic transitions led market forces, even illegal
market forces like drug trafficking,
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to become far more powerful than
many states.14 Economic reforms
reduced government regulations
of markets and trade while simultaneously trimming state budgets.
Borders became more porous and
created new opportunities for illicit
actors to hide their profits among
legal flows. In sum, the political and
economic transitions of the 1990s
weakened the power of the state, and
created opportunities for non-state
actors (such as organized crime syndicates) to exert their influence.
Today’s violence and criminal activity are also linked to developments
elsewhere in the hemisphere. Joint
U.S.-Colombian anti-drug operations
reduced the power of Colombian cartels, and Mexican cartels moved in to
fill the gap. When Mexico unleashed
its war on drugs in 2006, the illicit
drug market shifted its operations
south into Central America. In
2006, 23 percent of cocaine shipments moving north passed through
Central America. By 2011, this
amount had jumped to 84 percent, as
the Mexican offensive pressed cartel
activity south.15 The shift in drug
trafficking corridors corresponded to
increases in violence in the Northern
Triangle countries (Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras).

Confronting the Crime
Crisis: Successful
Policing Strategies
With the exception of Costa Rica,
the Central American governments
of today have inherited daunting
problems. There are clear differences in how these governments
have confronted these challenges,
however. In the Northern Triangle
countries, governments have by
and large responded to high rates of

violence and organized crime with
militarized (and often repressive)
policing strategies. In Guatemala,
El Salvador, and Honduras, “mano
dura” (loosely translated as “iron
fist”) policies rule the day, as
politicians tend to respond to
spiraling rates of public insecurity
with increasingly harsher policing
practices.16 Mano dura measures
may help win votes during elections,
but after almost two decades, they
have failed to stymie rising rates of
violent crime and have weakened
state protections of civil liberties
and human rights.
In contrast, Nicaragua and
Panama have employed different policing strategies. As noted
above, Nicaragua embarked on
police reform much earlier in
its history, creating an entirely
new civilian police force shortly
after the 1979 revolution. The
Contra War of the 1980s interrupted the operations of this new
police force, but with the return
of democracy in the 1990s, attention turned once again to policing
practices, and a series of reforms
resulted in a community-oriented
police force that emphasizes
prevention over repression. In
contrast to Honduras, where
the military occasionally patrols
alongside civilian police officers
to conduct mass arrests, police
officers in Nicaragua tend to be
embedded in communities. Police
officers are assigned to specific
neighborhoods, and instructed to
conduct regular patrols on foot
and/or in vehicle. Police officers
are also instructed to liaison with
civil society groups, and in some
areas police officials are encouraged to pursue university degrees
in public administration.
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Reformers link these communityoriented policing practices to a number of successful outcomes. Despite
Nicaragua’s history of inequality and
political violence, for the past two
decades it has registered crime rates
far lower than the rest of the region.
At $4,500 per capita, Nicaragua’s
gross domestic product (GDP) is less
than a quarter of Costa Rica’s, yet its
homicide rate is roughly the same.
Nicaragua’s rate of violent crime
is 75 percent lower than the other
post-conflict countries in the region
(Guatemala and El Salvador), despite
registering slightly lower levels of
GDP per capita than these countries.
Furthermore, both state and societal
forces tend to shun militarized policing practices, favoring preventive and
community-based initiatives that do
not run the same risk of jeopardizing human rights and civil liberties
as their mano dura counterparts. In a
2014 survey, Nicaraguans registered
some of the highest levels of support
in the region for preventive crimefighting practices, with 42 percent
endorsing preventive measures (such
as afterschool programs for youth,
street lights, job training for first-time
offenders) over punitive ones (for
example, longer prison sentences for
juvenile offenders, the death penalty,
and detention without due process).17
Promising police reforms in
Panama have more recent origins.
Homicide rates rose an alarming 90 percent in Panama from
2000 through 2010, but a series of
police reforms introduced in 2010
corresponded with reduced rates
of violent crime and more professional police forces. Reformers
have prioritized a civilian, community policing model in Panamanian
cities, and have aimed to integrate
police officers more cohesively
into the communities they serve.
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To increase the street presence of
police, reformers strived to replicate the Chilean model of dividing the national territory into
zones (“cuadrantes”) and assigning a police station to each zone,
along with the necessary vehicle
and personnel resources. Police
are responsible for personalizing
themselves with the communities
in their zone and working with
residents and civic organizations
to identify security concerns and
solve community problems. Police
salaries and professional training have improved substantially,
and civil society groups tie such
reforms to improved professionalism on the streets.18

FIGURE 3: TRUST IN POLICE AND RESPECT FOR CITIZENS’ RIGHTS (2014)

Public Evaluations of
Police Performance
Survey data can help gauge empirically how well police reforms
in Nicaragua and Panama have
improved both police performance
and police-community relationships. The Latin American Public
Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) 2014
AmericasBarometer includes several
survey questions that tap into public
perceptions and evaluations of police
forces throughout Central America.
When we compare public perceptions
of policing in Nicaragua and Panama
to the countries of the Northern
Triangle, we find that citizens register
more positive evaluations in the countries that have introduced community-oriented policing practices.
Trust in Police and Respect for
Citizens’ Rights
Figure 3 reports national levels of
trust in the police, and trust that
citizens’ basic rights are protected
in the country. Respondents in
Nicaragua and Panama registered

Source: 2014 AmericasBarometer, Latin American Public Opinion Project

significantly higher levels of trust in
police than respondents from other
countries in the region.19 When
asked whether they trusted the
political system to respect citizens’
rights, respondents in Nicaragua
and Panama also reported significantly higher levels of trust
than respondents in the Northern
Triangle countries. As Figure 3 indicates, perceptions that citizen rights

are protected were significantly
higher in Nicaragua and Panama
compared to the other countries
that transitioned to democracy in
the 1990s.20 Thus, the survey data
indicate that the two democratizing
countries that have employed community-friendly policing reforms
also report significantly higher
levels of trust in police and perceptions that basic rights are protected.
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Given the legacy of human rights
abuses in Nicaragua and Panama,
this finding is promising. Under
authoritarian rule, one of the major
grievances was that police and
military forces frequently abused
the human rights of the citizenry.
The survey results here indicate that
Nicaragua and Panama have made
progress on this crucial front.
Efficacy of the Justice System
To measure citizen evaluations of
the efficacy of the justice system,
commonly understood as comprising both the police and the
courts, LAPOP asked respondents
in Central America whether they
would trust the justice system to
punish the guilty party if they were
victimized by a crime.21 As Figure 4
illustrates, once again respondents
in Nicaragua and Panama report
significantly higher levels of trust
that the justice system is capable
of convicting perpetrators of
crime. Perhaps surprisingly, Costa
Rica scores low on this measure.
Interviews with Costa Rican justice
officials, police officers, and victims’
advocates suggest that these low
scores are most likely due to public
frustration with a sharp and sudden increase in violent crime in the
2000s, and the perceived inability
of the police to address criminality
decisively. Traditionally accustomed
to high levels of public safety and
professional police forces, Costa
Ricans have reacted swiftly and
negatively to abrupt deteriorations
in the status quo.
Other survey items indicate that
there is still room for improvement
in police performance. In 2014,
LAPOP included a new survey item
to measure respondents’ evaluations
of police response times: “Suppose
that someone robbed your house
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FIGURE 4: TRUST THE JUSTICE SYSTEM WILL PUNISH THE GUILTY PARTY

Source: 2014 AmericasBarometer, Latin American Public Opinion Project

and you called the police. How much
time do you think the police would
take to get to your house on a typical
day around noon?” Respondents
could select among five options: (1)
less than 10 minutes, (2) between ten
to 30 minutes, (3) more than 30 minutes but less than an hour, (4) more
than an hour but less than three
hours, (5) more than three hours.
If respondents replied on their own
that the police would never arrive,
they were coded as (6). Figure 5
reports average estimates of response
time in each Central American
country. While Panama joins Costa
Rica with the shortest response
times of the region, Nicaraguans
report the longest estimated response
times. Still, there are some positive
results from the Nicaraguan survey. In Nicaragua, there were no
significant linkages between anticipated police response time and the
race, ethnicity, wealth, education,
income, and gender of respondents.

In all of the other Central American
countries, respondents with darker
skin reported significantly longer
anticipated police response times. In
Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and
Guatemala, wealthier respondents
also reported significantly shorter
anticipated police response times. So
while Nicaraguans perceive police
as slow to respond to their calls, we
do not find the same socioeconomic
and racial differences in police
responsiveness as we observe in
other Central American countries.

Discussion
Given the severity of the Central
American crime crisis, coupled
with long historical legacies of
inequality, poverty, and repression,
the governments of the Northern
Triangle countries face a difficult
task ahead. To address the crime
wave and subsequent migration
crisis, these Central American
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FIGURE 5: PERCEIVED LENGTH OF POLICE RESPONSE TIME

Source: 2014 AmericasBarometer, Latin American Public Opinion Project

leaders can exert little control
over U.S. laws on drugs, guns,
and immigration. However, they
can invest in police institutions
that respond to the needs of their
citizens, and ensure that crimefighting tactics respect citizens’
rights. The case of Nicaragua in
particular illustrates that even
countries with few resources can
choose to channel those resources
wisely. In Nicaragua and Panama,
national surveys indicate that
the public registers more trust in
police and more positive evaluations of respect for citizen rights.
Respondents in these countries
also are more likely to think that
the justice system can sanction
criminals effectively. In Panama,
respondents also estimate that
police response times will be reasonable—between 10 minutes to
less than an hour. However, there

are significant socio-economic
and wealth disparities in people’s
evaluations of police responsiveness. People with lower levels of
education and income estimate that
police will be slower to respond
than their wealthier, more educated
counterparts. Likewise, women
and people of color also anticipate
slower police response times.
The United States has a vested
interest in promoting communityoriented policing strategies in the
region. Traditionally, the United
States has prioritized militarized
public security strategies over
preventive ones in its foreign aid
allocations. American police consultants such as William Bratton and
Rudolph Giuliani have reinforced
this message as they have successfully lobbied many Latin American
governments to import their
model of zero tolerance policing,

which has coincided with a spike
in human rights violations in some
urban areas. Given the inability of
these militarized policing strategies
to curb violent crime in Central
America, the United States has
shifted its focus slightly. In 2008,
the United States launched the
Central American Regional Security
Initiative (CARSI), investing $642
million to date to fight crime by
investing in “community policing,
gang prevention, and economic
and social programming for atrisk youth and communities.”22
Neighborhoods participating in
the program report lower levels
of violent and non-violent crime,
increased trust in police, and lower
levels of gang activity.23 While these
reports are promising, CARSI’s
funding is trivial given the scope
and severity of the security crisis.
Latin American presidents have
called upon the United States to
increase funding for CARSI, with
little success. To address the Central
American migrant crisis, President
Obama requested $1 billion to
target the root causes of poverty
and crime that lead so many people,
particularly children, to embark on
the perilous journey north. In June
of 2015, the U.S. Congress reserved
less than $300 million for this effort.
If the United States aims to reduce
the number of people fleeing north,
it must invest more seriously in
policing and public security practices that have a track record of
success. After almost two decades,
it is clear that iron fist, repressive
policing strategies do not work. As
the cases of Nicaragua and Panama
demonstrate, community-oriented
policing strategies are effective
in building citizens’ trust in their
police and fostering a culture of
respect for human rights.
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Data
This brief relies upon public opinion data from the 2004–2014
AmericasBarometer datasets,
conducted by the Latin American
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) of
Vanderbilt University (http://www.
vanderbilt.edu/lapop/). The author
would like to thank LAPOP and
its major supporters (the United
States Agency for International
Development, the Inter-American
Development Bank, and Vanderbilt
University) for making the data
available. Homicide data are available through the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime’s
(UNODC) Global Study on
Homicide (http://www.unodc.org/
gsh/en/data.html).
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